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South Africa’s Elections 2014:  
And the Winner is?
Henning Melber
On 7 May 2014, less than half a year after the death of Nelson Mandela, South Africans 
democratically elected for the fourth time since 1994 the country’s national parliament 
and the various provincial governments. In a generally relaxed climate, all seemed well 
in the rainbow nation. Most parties welcomed the announced results. But do they and 
the South African people now have cause for optimism?
Analysis
  This contribution presents a summary report and analysis of the final stages of the 
lead up to the elections, the vote count, and the results, partly based on personal 
observations during 4–10 May 2014. It comments on the political trends now likely 
to emerge, as indicated by both the election results and the reactions of the parties 
to them. Furthermore, it offers a mapping of the current political landscape in the 
country, as reproduced in the national and provincial parliaments – and also as it 
exists outside of these institutions of governance.
  Despite some institutional flaws that favored the ANC as the dominant party, the 
election campaigning was relatively open and fair – though, as always, the bigger 
parties had advantages thanks to the greater financial means at their disposal.
  The voting and counting processes happened with only a few minor disturbances 
therein, and even at local “hotspots” hardly any disruptions occurred that could 
have cast doubts on the legitimacy of the electoral procedures. 
  The final results officially announced were finally accepted by all parties and the 
wider public, which testifies to the democratic nature and general political stability 
of South Africa’s current governance system.
  The general analyses by observers tended to be more critical as regards the success 
of the bigger parties than the official party declarations themselves suggested, while 
it seems that the future of the ANC and of South Africa’s political landscape is being 
affected by growing voter apathy (mainly among the younger generation).
Keywords: South Africa, parliamentary elections, provincial elections, political parties, ANC, 
Democratic Alliance, Economic Freedom Fighters
- 2 -GIGA Focus International Edition/English  4/2013
The Pre-Election Atmosphere
Sunday (4 May 2014) witnessed the final rallies 
of the political parties campaigning. The general 
mood was relaxed, despite vocal complaints from 
the aging Zulu leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi that 
the country’s  elections were never free and fair. 
Since his Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) faced a rath-
er bleak future, his ramblings came as no surprise. 
Politically motivated violence against rival party 
supporters remained largely absent throughout 
the countrywide campaigns. The Democratic Al-
liance (DA) complained that supporters of the Af-
rican National Congress (ANC) had stoned three 
of their buses carrying members to final rallies in 
Johannesburg’s former townships of Soweto and 
Alexandra. 
The ANC dismissed these allegations as anti-
ANC propaganda. Nearby the alleged incidents, 
the ruling party held its final rally in the Johan-
nesburg FNB stadium, the arena where the public 
commemoration ceremony celebrated the life of 
Nelson Mandela in December 2013. Having then 
been jeered and booed at by the crowd, precaution-
ary measures were taken to protect the party pres-
ident and head of state Jacob Zuma from a sim-
ilar embarrassment occurring this time around. 
All those in the fully occupied 95,000-seater ven-
ue were thus carefully recruited and closely scru-
tinized by party cadres, so as to prevent another 
humiliating experience from unfolding.   
Frustration among the poor and marginalized 
over a lack of delivery of basic services had been 
continually growing during Zuma’s first term in 
office. On 2 May the Durban-based shack dwell-
er movement Abahlali baseMjondolo had, in a 
surprise announcement, asked his almost 30,000 
members to cast a “tactical vote” for the DA to 
teach the ANC a lesson. Another much discussed 
initiative was the “Vote No” campaign launched 
by former Security Minister Ronnie Kasrils. It mo-
bilized people around either voting for one of the 
small parties or spoiling the ballot paper outright 
to remind the ANC of its original values and prin-
ciples, so as to not risk it losing further popular 
support.
Ahead of Election Day, President Zuma spoke 
for the first time about the controversial “Nkand-
lagate” episode. This scandal had broken when it 
was disclosed that large amounts of public funds 
were being pumped into a private retirement res-
idence for Zuma and his family, something wide-
ly considered to be an abuse of government au-
thority and a misuse of taxpayers’ money. Zuma 
dismissed allegations that he was personally in-
volved in these dubious transactions. He was con-
fident that this was only an issue for the media 
and the opposition, but would not bother the ma-
jority of people supportive of the ANC (City Press 
2014). As he maintained: “They do not think it is 
an issue that will affect how they vote. This is an 
issue raised by bright people [those who think 
they know better]” (Quoted in Letsoalo 2014).
Interest focused increasingly on the issue of 
how the growing segments of the electorate who 
found themselves disappointed by government 
policy might vote – or, indeed, not. The Vote No 
campaign as well as the decision to utilize tactical 
voting sparked off a discussion about (non-)voting 
as a political articulation. “Make a Choice” urged 
the daily newspaper The Star in a front-page edi-
torial on 6 May. An article in the City Press predict-
ed that 46 percent voter turnout might be the low-
est since democratic elections first took place. Re-
portedly, “the largest group of unregistered vot-
ers are aged between 18 and 24 and constitute 38 
percent of the total” (Saba 2014).
While the ANC and the DA focused on their re-
spective employment creation policies as a major 
campaign theme, the Unemployed People’s Move-
ment (UPM) issued a statement on 5 May endors-
ing the Vote No campaign: “We are calling on our 
members to refuse to vote for the ANC and vote 
for any of the small parties, but not the DA, or to 
spoil their votes if they cannot bring themselves 
to support any of the small parties.” While it dis-
tanced itself from the decision of the shack dwell-
ers’ movement to make a tactical vote for the DA, 
the UPM defended its right to make such a contro-
versial shift of allegiance and stressed the need for 
“a serious and respectful conversation among all 
left forces about strategy and tactics for the long 
struggle ahead” (UPM 2014).
“The battle for the future commences” com-
mented Leonard Gentle (2014) in his pre-elec-
tion analysis, regarding the voting tendencies 
now emerging. Gentle, the director of the Inter-
national Labour Research and Information Group 
(ILRIG), concluded his prognosis by stating that: 
“Just 20 years after the vast majority of South Af-
ricans won the franchise, the public broadcaster, 
the print media, and the Independent Electoral 
Commission are now reduced to begging people 
to vote. It’s not Kasrils and his cohorts who are 
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spoiling the vote, it’s the ANC and all the parties 
of the elite.”
The Electoral Process and Vote Count
The Tshwane area (Pretoria and surroundings) 
was during Election Day as calm as on any other 
public holiday. When driving through some res-
idential areas in Pretoria, one could spot the oc-
casional orderly lining up of voters. Waterkloof, 
an upmarket residential area, had a few, mainly 
white, people visiting the polling station and it on-
ly took them a few minutes to exercise their demo-
cratic right. Queues in less posh Arcadia were lon-
ger, more mixed, and living proof of the rainbow 
nation’s existence. 
At both polling stations political parties were, 
beyond their election observers, barely visible and 
the atmosphere rather subdued. The ANC had an 
outpost in Arcadia, which kept track of registered 
members in the voting district. If they had not yet 
shown up by the afternoon, they were phoned 
as a reminder not to forget to pass by; the pages 
with names and cell phone numbers (proudly dis-
closed, with no concern for protecting the identity 
of those listed) were a sign that South African par-
ty activists are indeed now trying to use advanced 
communication technologies, though the (hand-
written) lists were obviously not computerized. 
Very different was the atmosphere in Mamelo-
di, a township on the outskirts of the capital. Out-
side of the polling station the ANC and the EFF 
had set their tables peacefully next to each other. 
They welcomed the distinct looking group of vis-
iting observers – some twenty young female stu-
dents from the United States and their local (el-
derly male) white companions – and enjoyed their 
exchanges with them. The queue of (exclusively 
black) voters was long in the morning but much 
shorter in the afternoon, with people calmly wait-
ing to be allowed into the polling station.
Only a few incidents were reported during the 
day and night. Considering the previously vio-
lent trajectory of a country marred by racial – and 
occasionally ethnic – divisions until twenty years 
ago, with politically motivated killings still being 
a regular occurrence today, this was a show of a 
true rainbow nation spirit – although, behind the 
peaceful façade, there might very well have been 
another less prominently reported reality.
Polling stations closed at 9pm. From mid-
night the first results began trickling in, and up-
dates were reported live by the national television 
broadcasters from the early hours of the morn-
ing. “I would like to do a little bit better than that, 
but I take it,” commented DA leader Helen Zille 
in the first live televised reaction to the 23 percent 
of the vote the Council for Scientific and Industri-
al Research (CSIR) projected the DA to win on the 
national level. Gwede Mantashe, ANC Secretary 
General, seemed not impressed that he was ap-
proached only after Helen Zille by the clearly pro-
government reporting of the national South Afri-
can Broadcasting Company (SABC). He conceded 
that he was slightly worried about the first results 
coming in from Gauteng and admitted that “we 
should do better.” 
With 95 percent of the votes having been count-
ed by the Friday morning (9 May), the Indepen-
dent Electoral Commission (IEC) expected the final 
results to become apparent during the afternoon of 
the same day. This was rather wishful thinking. Ir-
ritation had already been caused earlier in the day 
by the discovery of dumped ballot papers from a 
polling station in Pretoria and by a similar incident 
in Alexandra. However, in both cases the votes had 
reportedly previously been counted and the final 
results authorized by the party observers. A big di-
saster – which would have been the case with the 
necessity of a recount – was thereby averted. But 
these revelations remained a much-discussed em-
barrassment for the IEC, whose performance was 
far from being flawless. 
During Friday night the almost complete 
standstill of the vote count in Gauteng would be-
come a concern not only for the DA hoping to re-
place the provincial government of the ANC; it 
provoked even more the frustration of the EFF, 
which had high expectations for its own perfor-
mance in the capitalist center of the mining indus-
try. “At exactly 17:59 the ANC was at 50.21 per-
cent of the Gauteng vote, and immediately af-
ter that the Gauteng results started to slow down 
and almost came to an absolute halt because the 
ANC was heading towards below 50 percent of 
the Gauteng vote,” stated Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, as 
spokesperson for the EFF, on behalf of the party 
(EFF 2014). As of 2:30 am on Friday morning ma-
ny voting districts in the most contested parts of 
Johannesburg and Pretoria were as yet still not an-
nouncing results. From the early hours of the Fri-
day, however, the Gauteng vote count picked up 
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momentum again and votes for the ANC moved 
above the 50 percent threshold, with the party 
cruising into a more comfortable zone of 52 per-
cent plus of the vote.
When voting discrepancies were reported from 
some polling stations in Gauteng and the Western 
Cape between the IEC vote count being announced 
and the audited count made by election observers 
the legitimacy of the exercise was for a few mo-
ments seemingly at risk (Pillay 2014a). Come Sat-
urday morning the EFF seemed to suggest that it 
would not accept the results but launch an offi-
cial objection instead. Then, however, during the 
early afternoon EFF party leader Julius Malema 
declared in a statement that: “Whatever shenan-
igans they did we accept, it is part of the school 
fees you pay. There are no perfect elections. We do 
not want a civil war, we do not want this country 
in ashes. We love this country of Nelson Mandela” 
(Pillay 2014b). Much to the relief not only of the 
IEC this cleared the way for proceedings to con-
tinue, and so by early Saturday evening IEC chair-
person Pansy Tlakula could announce the official 
election results.1 
The Election Results
The National Parliament
There were no big surprises when it came to the 
distribution of the 400 national assembly seats 
among 13 out of the 29 parties competing. The 
forecasts based on the first election poll conduct-
ed by the CSIR were not that far wide of the mark, 
with only the EFF doing better than had been sug-
gested. The new constellation allowed for pol-
icy-making through negotiation and promised 
some interesting parliamentary debates: the ANC 
was confirmed once again as the dominant party 
(with minor losses), with the support of around 
11.5 million out of 18 million voters (62.15 per-
cent/249 seats); the DA, as the official opposi-
tion with the backing of some 4.1 million voters 
(22.23 percent/89 seats), became stronger; and, the 
EFF emerged as a new third force supported by 
1.2 million voters (6.35 percent/25 seats). 
Hitherto the new kids on the block – such as 
the Congress of the People (COPE) – had not last-
1 Full details of national and provincial voting figures are 
accessible on the IEC webpage at: <www.elections.org.za/
resultsNPE2014/>.
ed for long before disappearing again into irrel-
evance. In this election the COPE’s support base 
largely switched back to the ANC. Mamphela 
Ramphele’s newly created AGANG did not even 
have to worry about this: with just two seats in 
parliament, her party turned out to be a stillborn 
child. Her premature political flirtations with 
the DA, first agreeing to be its presidential can-
didate (without the endorsement of her party for 
that) and then backtracking on this the next day, 
in the end damaged her reputation irreversibly. 
“I offered her the world and she ended up in a 
shack in Pofadder [a remote place in the North-
ern Cape],” commented Helen Zille in a television 
interview during vote counting. In the end, Ram-
phele even opted out of accepting a mandate in 
parliament – thereby ending her political career 
before it had really started. In contrast, Bantu Ho-
lomisa expressed relief and delight that his United 
Democratic Movement (UDM) managed to create 
a minor surprise by crawling back to take 1 per-
cent of the vote. The worse results that the move-
ment received five years previously had suggest-
ed that they should be written off and might as 
well close shop.
The Provincial Governments
The DA failed to replace the ANC as the provincial 
government in Gauteng, but remained upbeat 
after increasing its votes by almost half to over 
30 percent and thus bringing the ANC closer to 
the 50 percent threshold. That the DA became the 
official opposition in KwaZulu Natal, ahead of the 
IFP, with 2 percent of the vote might be another 
consolation. The IFP suffered losses with the 
breaking away from it of the National Freedom 
Party (NFP), which ended up taking  fourth place 
in the province. Equally comforting for the DA 
might be the fact that its Western Cape stronghold 
was further cemented, with more than 59 percent 
of the vote taken there. But the EFF replaced 
the DA as the official opposition in the new EFF 
stronghold provinces of Limpopo and North West, 
and it also achieved a two-digit result in Gauteng.
The ANC might be disappointed by results in 
the Western Cape, with it taking just over one-
third of the vote there. While the party maintained 
its dominance elsewhere, the Gauteng vote – just 
like some other results were – represented any-
thing but a stellar performance. This election was 
not simply another exercise in rubber stamping 
the status quo. The number of votes secured by the 
- 5 -GIGA Focus International Edition/English  4/2013
DA and the EFF are significant signals that there is 
now shifting ground. The EFF will in future seek 
to anchor its base further among frustrated work-
ers and the unemployed. While the ANC sounds 
confident that is has survived a range of scandals 
and in-fights unscathed, it should have no reason 
for complacency. Dissenting voices from among 
the grassroots were louder and more radical than 
ever before in this election. 
The Political Perspectives
Attention here will focus on the possible emer-
gence of a new left party seeking inroads into parts 
of the tripartite alliance between the ANC, South 
African Communist Party (SACP), and in particu-
lar the frustrated segments of the internally divid-
ed Congress of South African Trade Unions (CO-
SATU), more than on the dynamics in the new na-
tional parliament and provincial governments. To 
some extent, the positioning of the EFF will be a 
contributing factor when it comes to determining 
what the scope of such a potential realignment of 
the country’s Left will be (for further possible sce-
narios, see de Wet 2014).
Despite the relief over the remarkably smooth 
running of the elections, circumstances enabling 
South Africa to maintain its international reputa-
tion, social divisions and gross inequalities have 
not gone away. Nor has the large-scale self-enrich-
ment of a new (and old) elite suddenly evaporated 
and disappeared. These problems are no closer to 
being resolved, and the antagonisms of a blatantly 
class-based society with extreme income discrep-
ancies – spiced with a grain of (at times not so) 
subtle racism as a residual factor for policy-mak-
ers – have not been automatically reduced. These 
elections and the results thereof have not really 
produced any new battle lines, which would in 
any case distract attention from the real challenges 
at hand. Put differently: there will not now be any 
(new) old excuses for the (old) new government.
Like everywhere else the big parties had a com-
parative advantage from the word go, while the 
government benefitted from its influence over the 
state media – in particular the SABC, which was 
blatantly partisan in its election coverage. Smaller 
parties faced, also as elsewhere, an uphill battle in 
terms of having more limited funds, staff, and vol-
unteers for campaigning. As such, the taking off of 
the EFF is even more impressive, despite its activ-
ists having originally expressed confidence that it 
would achieve even better results than it ultimate-
ly actually did. But beyond an unequal playing 
field and the reproduction of vested interests re-
mains the sense that South African voters showed 
an impressive degree of maturity in combination 
with an easy going approach, turning the elector-
al act in certain places into a form of leisure pur-
suit. One is therefore tempted to conclude that in 
the final reckoning the winner was not any of the 
parties but, if anyone at all, rather the electorate 
– or maybe those who ultimately decided not to 
vote for any of the parties, thereby achieving an 
intensive debate over politics and political behav-
iour in the country. 
After all, there is another hidden story here, as 
documented by a 16 percent drop in South African 
voter turnout over the last twenty years. In per-
centage points, the participation of registered vot-
ers in the country since 1999 has amounted to: 89.3 
(1999), 76.7 (2004), 77.3 (2009), and 73.5 (2014) (see 
Mataboge and Letsoalo 2014). Out of 18.65 million 
registered voters, one-quarter did not go to the 
polls and a quarter of a million people spoilt their 
ballot papers. This has been elaborated in more 
detail by a social movement activist as follows:
1994: Of the 23,063,910 eligible voters, 85.53 
percent (19,726,610) voted while the remain-
ing 14.47 percent (3,337,300) stayed away. The 
ANC received support from 53.01 percent 
(12,237,655) of the eligible voting population.
1999: Of the 25,411,573 eligible voters, 62.87 
percent (15,977,142) voted while the remain-
ing 37.13 percent (9,434,431) stayed away. The 
ANC received support from 41.72 percent 
(10,601,330) of the eligible voting population.
2004: Of the 27,994,712 eligible voters, 55.77 
percent (15,612,671) voted while the remain-
ing 44.3 percent (12,382,041) stayed away. The 
ANC received support from 38.87 percent 
(10,880,917) of the eligible voting population.
2009: Of the 30,224,145 eligible voters, 59.29 
percent (17,919,966) voted while the remain-
ing 40.71 percent (12,304,179) stayed away. 
The ANC received support from 38.55 percent 
(11,650,748) of the eligible voting population.
2014: Of the 31,434,035 eligible voters, 59.34 
percent (18,654,457) voted while the remain-
ing 40.66 percent (12,779,578) stayed away. 
The ANC received support from 36.39 percent 
(11,436,921) of the eligible voting population 
(McKinley 2014).
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Eight of the 13 parties in the new national as-
sembly won seats with less votes than the num-
ber of those that were spoilt. These were: the Free-
dom Front Plus (FF+) and the UDM, with four 
seats each; the African Christian Democratic Party 
(ACDP), the COPE, and the African Independent 
Congress (AIC), with three seats each; AGANG-
with two seats; and, the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) and the African People’s Convention (APC), 
with one seat apiece. The Vote No campaigners 
considered their mission to have been accom-
plished, given that the more than 250,000 votes 
spoilt would have placed them as the sixth-big-
gest party in the national assembly. Louise Col-
vin, as spokesperson for the initiative, comment-
ed that: “Given our history and the deep-seated 
loyalty South Africans have for the proud libera-
tion movement, we believe these elections mark a 
turning point whereby voters are prepared to shift 
from voting for a party to voting to strengthen the 
opposition” (Quoted in the Mail & Guardian 2014).
It seems, however, as if despite these optimis-
tic tones the intended sending of a strong warning 
to the ANC failed to achieve its goal in the eyes of 
the wider public. After all, if it was not for the EFF 
then South African politics would still largely be a 
case of business as usual in the wake of these elec-
tions. Minor shifts in the power balance on the lev-
el of provincial authorities promise a possible bat-
tleground for future control in some municipali-
ties during the next round of local elections (par-
ticularly in parts of the Eastern Cape). More inter-
esting will be whether – and, if so, to what extent – 
the EFF can effectively consolidate its status in the 
near future. Of secondary interest will be whether 
the fourth-placed IFP, which already had to share 
its votes with the NFP as a breakaway party from 
it, will survive another electoral period. Retaining 
ten seats, six went to the NFP – with it thus being 
the fifth-strongest party represented in the nation-
al assembly.
President Zuma welcomed the announcement 
of the official results as “reaffirmation that South 
Africa indeed has a good story to tell” (Mataboge 
2014). But Dale McKinley set the record straight 
when he concluded that: 
The official version of these latest national elec-
tions (in many cases, mirrored by the media) 
is one in which there is a “high voter turnout” 
and where the ANC victory is presented as in-
dicative of support from the “majority of vot-
ers.” And so it is that the almost 13 million who 
decided not to participate in the 2014 elections 
(whether registered or not) are effectively air-
brushed from the picture, while the 11.5 mil-
lion who voted for the ANC become “the peo-
ple.” Stalin would be smiling approvingly. 
[…] In his post-election speech President Zu-
ma stated that the ANC’s electoral victory rep-
resents an “overwhelming mandate from our 
people … and reaffirms that the ANC remains 
the only true hope for the majority of our peo-
ple.” Clearly, he and his organization have not 
read the whole story (McKinley 2014).
The two stories one can divulge from these election 
results – in other words, the one of victory for 
the ANC that contrasts with the one of a gradual 
erosion of legitimacy through a stronger opposition 
and/or as a result of many refusing to participate 
in the act of voting – illustrate the fundamental 
divide that exists in South African society. It 
might have seemed for the external observers of 
the voting and its aftermath as if electing their 
national and provincial governments was not a 
big deal for South Africans. The most spectacular 
discovery might in retrospect have been that – 
with the exception of the temporary Gauteng 
hiccup – there was actually not really anything 
spectacular happening at all. A few isolated minor 
incidents reported during Election Day suggested 
irregularities or interferences caused by acts of 
violent or insults were considered barely worth 
mentioning by the media, due to their perceived 
lack of seriousness. This might, however, actually 
represent a careless act of negligence and oversight 
regarding what is really going on at the grassroots 
level. Views from the ground tend to give less 
cause for celebration. As observed by Richard 
Poplak, who was in Alexandra the night ballot 
boxes temporarily went missing, “the fact that 
we are all fellow citizens united by democratic 
expression does not seem to mean much. For the 
men standing by the fire, the only ballots that 
speak are those that were not counted” (Poplak 
2014).
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